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Abstract 
Effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the degree to which policy interest rate 
affects all other financial prices, including the entire term structure of interest rates, 
credit rates, exchange rates and asset prices.  An effective monetary policy framework 
can be seen as a pre-condition for well-functioning financial markets. However, 
effectiveness of the monetary policy is not straightforward to measure and requires 
empirical work to understand the effects of financial infrastructure, competitiveness of 
financial markets as well as current economic conditions. This paper examines the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy in Turkey by focusing on the interest rate pass-
through behavior by means of an Interacted Panel Vector Autoregressive (IPVAR) 
approach. The results suggest that policy rate innovations transmit fully in less than 
eight months. Regulatory quality of the country, competition, liquidity, and profitability 
of banking sector, dollarization and exchange rate flexibility, inflation, and term 
structure have a positive effect on interest rate pass-through. Short-term credit ratio, 
GDP growth, monetary growth, and capital inflows have a negative effect. 
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Transmission from central bank policy rates to banks’ deposit and credit rates is crucial 
for the well-being of an economy. Central banks implement policy rules toward two main policy 
objectives, namely price stability and output stability. Their most important tool to achieve the 
objectives is the control of liquidity in the banking sector and hence the short-term interbank 
interest rate.  The effectiveness of this policy tool depends on various channels of transmission. 
If a central banks raises its policy rate but retail rates, asset prices and exchange rates do not 
respond then policy turns out to be ineffective. Hence identifying different transmission 
mechanisms is central in understanding the effectiveness of central banks’ actions (Loayza and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002).  
The existing literature has already identified various channels of monetary transmission. 
These channels consist of short- and long-term interest rate channels, credit channel, 
exchange-rate channel, asset channel, and balance-sheet channel. The main monetary policy 
transmission channel runs from the overnight interbank interest rate to short-term interest 
rates.  This channel basically works as follows: suppose that in line with its counter-cyclical 
monetary policy stance, central bank is interested in inducing economic stimulus in response 
to weakening economic conditions.  As a first step, it purchases financial assets to inject 
additional liquidity into the banking system.  This additional liquidity reduces the overnight 
interbank rates.  The ability to borrow at lower overnight rates encourages the banks to 
purchase additional short-term government papers, leading to further cascade of reductions in 
the short-term risk-free interest rates.  This is the interest-rate channel at work (Mishra et al., 
2012). 
This study aims to test how much policy rates transmit to credit and deposit rates of 
banks operating in Turkey, i.e. the short-term interest rate pass-through. We limit our analysis 
period to 2002-2014 since it has been the longest stable period in Turkish monetary policy and 
banking environment. We employ interacted panel vector autoregressive (IPVAR) methodology 
in our analysis (Towbin and Weber, 2011) owing to its analytical strength as well as versatility. 
It mainly allows us to understand pass-through of policy rates to market rates at various values 
of other economic variables which are present as interactions.     
Effectiveness of transmission channels require a competitive banking sector, well-
developed stock and credit markets, a fully liquid financial sector, totally independent central 
bank, maximum quality of institutional and regulatory environment, a floating exchange rate 
regime, full market development and effective secondary market for government securities 
(Cotarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Cottarelli et al., 1995; Cecchetti, 1999; Ehrmann et al., 2001; De 
Bondt (2002); Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Leiderman et al., 2006; Ito and Sato, 2006; 
Betancourt et al. (2008); Frisancho-Marischal and Howells (2009); Mishra et al. 2012; 
Saborowski and Weber, 2013; Leroy and Lucotte, 2015). Following this long recipe of the earlier 
literature, we use proxies representing these factors as interaction variables. There are five 
constructs: Regulatory quality and competitiveness, dollarization, financial development, 
banking sector features, and macroeconomic features. We measure regulatory quality and 
competitiveness by means of regulatory quality index, Boone indicator, and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. We use ratio of foreign currency loans and foreign currency position to 
measure dollarization; GDP per capita, broad money and short-term credit rate to measure 
financial development; liquidity, profitability and bad asset ratio to notate attributes of banking 
Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: Evidence from Turkey 
 
3 
sector; and lastly we use Turkish LIBOR, Turkish industrial production index, consumer price 
index, and financial account of GDP as macroeconomic variables. 
Our results show that short-term interest rate pass-through is positively related to 
regulatory environment and competition in banking sector. Increased competition and higher 
regulatory quality cause an increase in pass-through. Profitability, liquidity, bad asset ratio, 
exchange rate flexibility, and dollarization have a positive effect on pass-through, too. On the 
other hand, domestic macroeconomic and international variables and development of financial 
system have ambiguous effects on pass-through. GDP per capita and broad money have 
negative effect on the speed of pass-through, whereas short term credits ratio increase 
transmission in deposit rate, but decrease transmission in credit rates. Growth of industrial 
production index and financial account of GDP decreases pass-through to both type of rates. 
Turkish LIBOR and inflation have a negative effect on transmission to deposit rates and a 
positive effect on transmission to credit rates. Inclusion of each different interaction variable 
in the IPVAR specifications implies a different duration for completion of pass-through, where 
those durations are typically less than 8 months. 
Our results suggest important hints to policy makers. First, policy makers should 
improve regulatory quality and banking sector competition while reducing banking 
concentration. Second, since dollarization has a positive effect on interest rate pass-through, 
they should not enforce use of national currency in banking transactions. In other words, 
globalization does not slow down interest rate pass-through. Third, liquidity and profitability in 
banking positively affect the pass-through; therefore, banking sector’s stability should be 
enhanced. Fourth, growth in production, broad money, and financial development, and capital 
inflows lower the degree of pass-through. Finally, inflation and term structure have a positive 
effect on interest rate pass-through.   
This paper contributes to interest rate pass-through literature by employing an IPVAR 
methodology allowing one to measure impulse-response functions conditional upon certain 
values of other variables of concern, i.e. the interaction variables. In that, the paper employs a 
comprehensive list of interaction variables so as to shed light on monetary policy effectiveness 
in Turkey and finds that policy rates are transmitted to retail rates within 8 months in Turkey in 
the 2002-2014 period.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the related 
literature and elaborates the interest-rate pass-through in Turkey; and Section 3 presents data, 
estimation method and empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes the study in association with 
policy discussions and recommendations. 
2. A Brief Review of the Literature 
A. Monetary Transmission 
We can define the transmission mechanism between central bank rates and market interest 
rates using three different approaches. The first approach, monetary policy approach, 
measures the pass-through from monetary policy rate to retail rates directly. The second 
approach is named as cost of funds approach and measures the pass-through from longer-term 
market rates towards retail rates. The third approach combines the first two: firstly, pass-
through from monetary policy rate to long-term market rates is measured and secondly the 
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pass-through from short-and long-term market rates to retail rates is computed (Egert and 
MacDonald, 2009). 
Literature has identified various channels of monetary transmission. These channels 
consist of short- and long-term interest rate channels, credit channel, exchange-rate channel, 
asset channel, and balance-sheet channel. The main monetary policy transmission channel runs 
from the overnight interbank interest rate to short-term interest rates.  This channel basically 
works as follows: Suppose that as a result of its counter-cyclical monetary policy objective, 
central bank is interested in creating further economic stimulus in response to weakening 
economic conditions.  As a first step, government purchases financial assets to inject additional 
liquidity into the banking system.  This additional liquidity in the banking system then reduces 
the overnight interbank rates.  Being able to borrow at a lower overnight interest rates, banks 
tend to purchase additional short-term government papers, leading to further cascade of 
reductions in the short-term risk-free interest rates (Mishra et al., 2012).   
Alternatively, the central bank can use another policy tool such as the reserve 
requirements.  In response to weakening economic conditions, central bank may now decrease 
the required reserve ratio so as to leave banks with excess cash balances. Banks can again 
purchase more government securities, inducing a fall in interest rates on government 
securities.  Finally, the central bank may want to intervene directly in financial markets by 
purchasing short-term government securities.  The sellers of these securities will now have 
excess cash and they may deposit in the banking system. This would again cause a fall in the 
interbank rates. This relationship is named as “short-term interest rate channel” (Mishra et al., 
2012).  
The changes in short-term interest rate may also affect overall economic conditions, 
investors’ willingness to take risks and the price of risk.  This channel is named as “credit 
channel.” The effect on short-term interest rates on floating exchange rates can be measured 
as “exchange-rate channel.” The effect of short-term interest rates on long-term interest rates 
can be named as “long-term interest rates channel.”  Long-term interest rates affect asset 
prices usually in the “asset-price channel” and lastly, changes in asset prices that can affect 
company values directly or indirectly is called “balance-sheet channel” (Mishra et al., 2012). 
Effectiveness of transmission channels require competitive banking sector, well-
developed stock and credit markets, and freely floating exchange rates. Some assumptions, 
such as a fully liquid financial sector, totally independent central bank, maximum quality of 
institutional and regulatory environment, a floating exchange rate regime, full market 
development and an effective secondary market for government securities are necessary to 
keep the transmission level at 100%. No countries have yet arrived that level where pass-
through is higher for developed countries than emerging markets, and low-income countries 
own the lowest pass-through rates (Mishra et al., 2012). 
Why do banks not adjust their loan rates completely to policy rates? Is there credit 
stickiness? According to the empirical study of Berger and Udell (1992), there is credit rationing 
and loan rate stickiness exists in the US. Customer relations, monopoly power, and default risk 
can be used to explain the tradeoff between risk sharing and benefits of credits for both banks 
and credit users. Credit rationing can be limited if protective contracts for both parties can be 
designed (Fried and Howitt, 1980).  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explain credit rationing based on 
asymmetric information models. They argue that loan rates stay sticky in practice, even though 
the theory requires flexibility to comply with demand and supply changes. Banks avoid changing 
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loan rates easily to attract more customers. They know that new customers attracted by new 
rates will be from a higher risk group, which would reduce bank profits. Klemperer (1987) 
explains loan rate stickiness by using learning costs, transaction costs, and artificial costs 
imposed on loans by firms. These switching costs determine loan rate stickiness and corporate 
strategy of financial firms. Contrarily, some studies do not find credit rationing in some 
countries, such as Chile (Bernstein and Fuentes, 2004).  
B. Interest Rate Pass-through 
Literature about interest rate pass-through can be classified into two sections. Many 
studies focus on individual countries and try to find out the temporary changes in pass-through 
levels, structural breakdowns and determinants of pass-through in each country. Interest rate 
pass-through in developing economies is asymmetrical between types of credits and deposits. 
Pass-through between market interest rates and corporate and consumer loan rates in 
Hungarian market can be depicted as quick for 1997-2004 period, because major fraction of 
pass-through is realized in two months. Results indicate perfect pass-through in corporate 
loans; somewhat lower pass-through in consumer loans; and a lower level pass-through in 
deposit rates. Speed of adjustments on bank rates are influenced by the sign of yield shocks, 
size of the changes and volatility of market rate, and distance of bank rates from their long-run 
equilibrium level (Horvath et al., 2004). Monetary transmissions on interest rates and credit 
channels in Poland for the period of 1995-2002 show that credit channel is affected by degree 
of capitalization and bank’s size. Pass-through rate in Poland is comparable to that in Euro zone 
for the same period (Wrobel and Pawlowska, 2002). More profitable and riskier banks reflect 
interest rate changes faster than less profitable and less risky banks in Poland. However, the 
opposite is true for term deposits (Chmielewski, 2004). Pass-through in lending rates is not 
complete and alternative credit rates have diverse pass-through rates in Ireland between 1980 
and 2001. Additionally, there a number of structural breaks in the analysis period (Bredin et al., 
2001).  
Interest rate pass-through in developed economies is not more homogenous.  Pass-
through for the UK for 1985-2001 should not be taken granted, it is time-varying and the change 
in the pass-through depends on whether the perceived gap between bank’s rates and market 
rates (base rates) is widening or narrowing (Hoffman and Mizen, 2004). Larger credit 
institutions adjust their lending rates to market rates faster than smaller credit institutions in 
Germany for 1993-2000 period. Banks that use savings deposits as a major refinancing 
instrument have sticky lending rates compared to other banks. Riskier banks in terms of long-
term lending adjust their lending rates faster than the banks which cover their long-term 
commitments. Banks in longer term relationships with customers have stickier rates than the 
banks with shorter-term relationships (Weth, 2002). Small and less liquid banks transmit policy 
rates faster than bigger and liquid banks do, and bank lending channel has been quite important 
for the US monetary policy from 1976 to 1993 (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).   
Studies in the second group compare a group of similar and diverse countries’ pass-
through rates and classify countries based on their characteristics. Comparative studies find 
differences in pass-through rates between developed and less-developed country groups. 
Developed countries have a higher rate of pass-through, basically because of more flexible 
exchange rate regimes and more developed financial systems. Studies also observe time-
dependency in pass-through rates: Pass-through is high and increasing in time between 2003-
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2008 (financial stability period). However, 2008 crisis reversed the increasing trend: Banks 
increased precautionary liquidity holdings, non-performing loans jumped up and inflation level 
fell down (Saborowski and Weber, 2013). Long term interest rates, asset prices, tightness of 
monetary conditions, exchange rates, financial fragility, and inflation are some factors that 
affect monetary transmission mechanism (Kamin et al., 1998). Monetary transmission 
mechanism in low income countries is weak. Putting methodological deficiencies aside, there 
are also stabilization issues. Stabilization problems are hard to tackle and acute. Therefore, it is 
very challenging to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in low income countries 
(Mishra and Pontiel, 2012). Weak financial market structure reduces effectiveness of securities 
markets. Therefore, interest rate and asset prices pass-through are weak if they exist at all in 
less developed countries. Since central bank intervention is heavy and exchange rate flexibility 
is low, exchange rate channel is undermined. Competition is imperfect in banking sector, and 
cost of lending is high. Moreover, banks hold excess reserves and mostly domestic public bonds. 
The role of intermediation in banking sectors is not deservedly undertaken, and therefore bank 
lending channel is impaired. As a result, monetary transmission is weak due to problems in 
financial market structure in low income countries (Mishra et al., 2012). A positive correlation 
can be found between interest rate pass-through and per capita GDP, inflation, exchange rate 
flexibility, credit quality, overhead costs, and banking competition. There is a negative 
correlation between interest rate pass-through and market volatility and excess banking 
liquidity (Gigineishvili, 2011). Structure of financial system, banking sector concentration, 
capital flows and barriers to entry and size and efficiency of the money market are found to be 
other affecting factors (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994).  
Interest rate pass-through in European countries before the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) was established shows asymmetries in adjustment processes and structural breaks, 
which would indicate problems in the application of a single monetary policy (Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2000). Member countries converge slowly as their national banking systems adjust 
to the new monetary regime, but structural breaks can occur by the official circulation of euro 
(Marotta, 2009). Size, liquidity, capitalization of individual banks, small banks, banks’ health, 
availability of alternative finance may be important in terms of monetary policy (Ehrmann et 
al., 2001; Cecchetti, 1999).  
Studies done at the beginning of the EMU process display similar results. There are 
structural breaks, high level of heterogeneity due to country level factors, such as GDP growth 
and bank specific factors, and the speed of pass-through is different in member countries. Even 
though the results suggest increase in the efficiency of monetary policy, the market is 
fragmented and far from convergence (Sander and Kleimeier, 2003, 2006; Kok Sorensen and 
Werner, 2006; Angeloni et al., 2003). However, convergence should be likely because monetary 
policy of many countries are in line, and cyclical behaviors of economies are similar (Mihov, 
2001).  
Findings of studies changed after several years of establishment of the EMU. Stronger 
competition leads lower interest rates spreads and stronger pass-through in interest rates. 
Competition is stronger in the loan market than that in the deposit market. Competition should 
be increased to fasten up the pass-through in monetary transmission mechanism (Van 
Leuvensteijn et al.,2006). Pass-through in developed European economies hit the bottom after 
the 2008 crisis. Especially, the difference between lending rates and policy rates are at record 
levels low in Germany and the US, but higher in other countries (Illes and Lombardi, 2013). 
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Pass-through in the US is higher for both bank deposit rates and lending rates in the US 
compared to Euro area for both short and long run (Kwapil and Scharler, 2007).  
Studies of interest rate pass-through in Asian countries display lower convergence rates.  
Pass-through in developed Asian countries is stickier. Deposit rate pass-through is higher than 
lending rate pass-through in both developed and less developed countries (Singh et al., 2008). 
Tai et al. (2012) analyze interest rate pass-through in Asian countries for the period of 1988-
2010. Their results suggest that almost all countries have very low pass-through from market 
rates to deposit and credit rates in the post-crisis period. Malaysia is the only exception, 
indicating a more efficient monetary transmission in Asia.  
C. Interest Rate Pass-through in Turkey 
Turkey suffered from its less developed financial markets and macroeconomic 
instability for years before 2000s. The restrictions in financial markets were intense before 2000 
banking crisis, they gradually reduce afterwards thanks to reforms in financial sector and 
growth trend in world financial markets. We can draw a parallel line between pre-2000 Turkey 
and the low income countries depicted in Mishra et al. (2012). They summarize the problems 
in low income countries evidently: High cost of credits and weak competition in the financial 
sector force banks to hold high level of reserves and domestic public bonds when deposit 
channel enlarges. It causes frictions in interest rate and bank lending pass-through along with 
other restrictions in monetary transmission channels. Turkey’s banking and economic system 
was suffering from these problems evidently. Credits provided to private sectors were limited, 
and loan rate stickiness was unclear before 2000s. Taking into account high indebtedness, 
chronic-high inflation, and high macroeconomic instability, this result was not surprising (Aydin, 
2007). Credit markets developed after 2000s by assigning a pioneering role on banks. Credit 
channel enlarged due to a reduction in perceived risk: Reduction in public indebtedness, 
reduction in interest and inflation rates, and permanent financial stability period allowed banks 
to provide more credits. As the newly emerged private bonds market is still in its infancy, bank 
lending remains as the main source of debt financing in Turkey.  
Earlier studies suggest contradicting results on policy transmission. Interest rate pass-
through is very effective; exchange rate pass-through has a semi-strong power; stock market 
and credit channel pass-through is not effective in Turkish economy (Kasapoglu, 2007). Ornek 
(2009) argues that stock market and banking credit channels are not effective in Turkey. 
Suggesting M2 aggregate of money to be an effective tool to manage monetary policy, Peker 
and Canbazoglu (2011) argue that credit channel is effective. Tests reveal asymmetries in all 
lending rates, i.e. banks adjust themselves to increases faster than decreases. Moreover, 
reluctance to adjust the policy rate varies based on the credit rate, which may be interpreted 
as heterogeneity or temporariness in the market (Yildirim, 2012).  Aktan et al. (2014) find a 
positive relationship between expansionary monetary policies and risk taking behavior for 
2002-2013 period. Accordingly, risk taking behavior declines in policy rates. However, if interest 
rates fall below their long-run average, the sign of the relationship reverts to negative. The 
smaller the bank size, the stronger this effect is.  Ucak and Yildirak (2012) find stronger pass-
through for corporate loans and weaker pass-through for housing and cash rates. Capital 
adequacy ratio plays a role in credit channel of pass-through (Degirmen and Ozag, 2007). Basci 
et al. (2006) can be visited for more on improvements in transmission mechanism in Turkey 
after 2000s.  
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3. Empirical Analysis 
A. Data and Variables 
i. Interest Rates 
We adopt the first method of Egert and MacDonald (2009) to measure the transmission 
between Turkish policy rate and retail interest rates. This method is called the monetary policy 
approach; it measures the pass-through from monetary policy rate to retail rates directly. 
In our analysis, the policy rate of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) is constructed as a 
combination of three different rate settings: from the beginning of our sample, February 1 
2002, until May 20 2010, the CBRT used the overnight repo rate as its policy rate with a 
symmetric corridor around. After this date, the Bank replaced its policy rate with the weekly 
repo rate until the third quarter of 2010. Then it adopted a complex interest rate corridor 
system with a central rate of weekly repo surrounded by upper and lower bounds of overnight 
repo rates having an asymmetric structure most of the time. By means of such a complex 
system of rates, the CBRT enjoyed a great flexibility against rapid and massive capital inflows as 
well as domestic credit market imbalances. In line with the agenda of the Monetary Policy 
Committee, the policy rates are subject to potential change typically in the second half of every 
month, not necessarily reflecting perfect periodicity. So, while compiling our policy rate series 
we first chained different policy rates at a daily frequency as of the dates given above. The chain 
is composed of the overnight policy rate until 20 May 2010, the weekly policy rate until October 
2010 and the effective funding rate onwards. At the end, the daily series of policy rates was re-
expressed at monthly frequency using monthly averages. Our final series, hence, is a 
combination of time-weighted averages of three different policy rates possibly yielding the best 
possible proxy for the stance of monetary policy. 
Regarding the deposit and credit rates, the CBRT distinguishes deposit rates as 1-, 3-, 6, 
12-month and more than 12-month rates. Average maturities of deposit accounts in Turkish 
banking sector as of 2013 is as follows: 19% of all deposits are drawing accounts, 15% are 
deposited up to 1-month, and 53% are deposited up to 3-months, whereas the average 
maturity of all deposits remains less than 3 months (BRSA, 2013). Since drawing accounts earn 
no interest, we used 1-month and 3-month deposits to proxy Turkish retail deposit market 
rates. On the credit side, we used commercial credit rates, allocated in Turkish liras. We have 
got consumer, auto, housing, and commercial credit rates, allocated in Turkish liras, Euro and 
dollars. We prefer using commercial rates, because they are linked more with the real 
economy, however, we perform the analyses for consumer rates as well. Note that all rates we 
study are Turkish lira deposit and loan rates. Market interest rate data were collected from the 
Electronic Data Delivery System of the CBRT and were expressed as volume-weighted series. 
The weekly data published every Friday were converted to monthly frequency as in the case of 
policy rate data. Figures 1 and 2 display the evolution of policy, deposit and credit rates. A first 
glance at these figures suggests that the lines are smoother for deposits and more volatile for 
credits, which might be indicative of higher susceptibility of credit rates to policy rates. 
The analysis period covers February 2002-December 2014. The CBRT started inflation 
targeting in January 2002, at the same time the reference policy rate is determined as CBRT 
O/N borrowing rate. The feature of this period is to have very high and volatile rates in the 
overall economy. High interest rates mitigated as inflation fell down during late 2000s. We also 
analyze the 2008-2014 sub-period as a more stable period, where interest rates are rather 
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lower and more stable, inflation is limited, banking sector is more functional in intermediation 
and credit market is operating more efficiently. 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
Turkish bank credit rates in the analysis period can be seen in Figure 1. Rates shrink to 
lower than 20% level in 2014 from above 70% in 2002. Auto, house, and commercial credit 
rates were lower than policy rate in many months of 2002 and beginning months of 2003; 
moreover, only house credit rates were lower than policy rate on July and August 2007. The 
reason for the former can be high competition in banking sector at the initial stage of credit 
boom, and the reason for the latter can be great confusion of households to keep their 
mortgages in the forthcoming crisis period. Mortgage market was newly established in Turkey 
in 2005 and as an infant industry trust in the system was less in 2007 than it is today. 
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of deposit rates and the policy rate in Turkey. Deposit rates 
can be depicted as lower bound compared to credit rates. Rates fell down to 10% level in 2014 
from above 60% level in 2002. Probably, due to high liquidity in the credit boom around 2004, 
deposit rates were lower than policy rate. A different period, when 1-month deposit rates were 
lower than the policy rate is 2014. 
ii. Correlations among Interest Rates 
We follow Mishra et al. (2012) to measure the contemporaneous and longer term 
correlation between the policy rate and deposit and credit rates. We compute correlations by 
means of changes in interest rates. Contemporaneous correlation is the static correlation 
between policy rate and each of the credit and deposit types during the analysis period. Short-
term and long-term correlation is measured based on the following estimation. 
 1 2 1 2t t t t t t ty y y x x x                (1) 
where y represents the policy rate, x represents each of credit and deposit rates, and t is the 
time subscript, which is measured as a month. We estimate the equation one by one for each 
of credit and deposit types.   is the measure for short-term correlation (1-month lag). Long-
term correlation is measured by ( ) / (1 )        . Table 1 displays the results. 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 shows the results of correlation analysis. The contemporaneous correlation 
between policy rate and retail rates is 64% on average for retail credits. This indicates a 0,64% 
increase in average credits within a month following a 1% increase in the policy rate. Short-
term effect (1 month) on average credits is 41%. However, the longer-run effect is much higher, 
82%. The results show that pass-through in credit market is incomplete, and compared to the 
results in Mishra et al. (2012), pass-through in credit rates places Turkey among her emerging 
market peers.  
The results are stronger for deposits. Contemporaneous correlation between policy rate 
and discount rates is 85%. Short-term effect is 87%, and long-term effect is 96%. Pass-through 
is almost complete in the long-and short-run deposits markets. These values are compatible 
with values of emerging markets and developed economies analyzed in Mishra et al. (2012). 
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iii. Interaction Variables 
As explained subsequently, we employ a number of interaction variables so as to 
measure impulse-response functions conditional upon their first and third quantiles, 
differentiating the speed and intensity of interest rate pass-through. Marginal effect of a 
change in the interaction variable affects dynamic relationship among endogenous variables 
and it also affects the level of the variables (Towbin and Weber, 2011). Since the relationship 
between policy rate and retail rates is long-termed and complicated; it is open to influence 
from many other variables (Mishra et al., 2012). Earlier single and cross country studies suggest 
potential variables affecting pass-through mechanism. We can call these variables as structural 
characteristics of an economy. Financial structure, regulatory and institutional quality 
constitute a major part of structural characteristics of an economy; thus they are determinants 
of effectiveness of monetary policy (Cecchetti, 1999; Cotarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Ehrmann et 
al., 2001; Saborowski and Weber, 2013). We collect a list of prospective interaction variables 
based on literature survey. After eliminating the ones not available for Turkish economy, we 
are left with 16 variables and grouped these interaction variables as ‘competition and 
regulatory quality’, ‘exchange rate flexibility and dollarization’, ‘financial development’, 
‘banking sector related variables’, and ‘macroeconomic variables’.  
Regarding the aforementioned country characteristics, we measure regulatory quality 
using the World Bank Regulatory Quality Index (RQI). Following Mishra et al. (2012) and 
Saborowski and Weber (2013), we expect that weaker regulatory environments generate 
uncertainty in the financial system and induce higher costs of financial intermediation. As a 
result, banks’ sensitivity to policy rate declines, and pass-through mechanism slows down. 
Lower competition and higher concentration in the banking industry end up with the same 
effect. Having a look at the banking sector competition and concentration, lower competition 
or higher concentration results in higher margins, thus low interest rate pass-through in the 
banking industry (Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Saborowski and Weber, 2013; Mishra et al, 2012 
Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Cottarelli et al., 1995).  To measure banking sector competition, 
we employ two alternative variables. The first one is Boone indicator (Boone, 2008), which is 
an index of banking sector competition. We obtained Boone series for Turkey from St. Louis 
FED web site. The second variable to assess competitiveness is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), which measures concentration in a sector. We compute the HHI index annually for 2002-
2014 period for Turkish banking sector on the basis of their asset shares where data on total 
assets of banks were taken from the Banks Association of Turkey.    
Dollarization and flexibility in exchange rate regime are also important as interest rate 
pass-through can be weaker in highly dollarized economies and low exchange rate flexibility 
(Mishra et al, 2012; Saborowski and Weber, 2013). Dollarization also makes banks vulnerable 
to exchange rate risks and can have a positive impact on interest rate pass-through (Leiderman 
et al., 2006). We measure exchange rate flexibility as the ratio of foreign currency loans to M2 
monetary aggregate (FCLM2). Dollarization is measured as foreign currency position (difference 
between foreign currency liabilities and foreign currency assets) to equity in the banking 
industry. We can call this ratio in short as net foreign currency position (NFCP). The data for 
foreign currency deposits and M2 are obtained from CBRT and Ministry of Development, 
foreign currency position to equity ratios are obtained from the Banks Association of Turkey. 
Financial development has an expected positive effect on interest rate pass-through. It 
increases the variety of alternative investment tools, thus enhancing competition (Cotarelli and 
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Kourelis, 1994; Saborowski and Weber, 2013). We use per capita GDP (GDPPC) and broad 
money (M2GDP) to measure financial development. We obtain these series from the World 
Bank Databank. Additionally, we employ average short term credits-to-all credits ratio (STC) as 
a proxy for financial development. STC shows the density of short-term investments over all 
investments. It is a signal for the reliability of financial system. Density of short term credits is 
expected to be lower in developed financial systems. Longer-term credits become wide-spread 
as trust to the financial market increases. The STC ratio evolved to 35% from 55% in the 14-
year sample period in Turkish banking sector. The drop in short-term credits ratio may be a 
signal of trust in the investments in Turkey. STC series were obtained from the Bank Association 
of Turkey. 
Cecchetti (1999) emphasize the role of financial structures and soundness of banking 
industry. He uses number of publicly traded firms, publicly traded firms per capita, market 
capitalization-to-GDP, corporate debt-to-GDP, bank loans-to-GDP, and bank health ratios. We 
do not use these variables because some of these variables are not available for Turkey, and 
some variables make sense only in panel data. We should also mention that capital markets 
and bank debt are the only sources of financing in Turkey. There was not an actively functioning 
corporate debt market until 2010. And it is still an infant industry. Thus, we think the variables 
that assess the soundness of banking, such as liquidity, profitability, and bad debt ratios are 
more important in the Turkish case.   
We use liquid assets-to-total assets (LIQ), revenues before interest -to-expenses before 
interest (NIRE), return on equity (ROE), non-performing loans to total assets (NPL) in the overall 
banking system as banking level variables. Higher liquidity is expected to limit banks’ sensitivity 
(or responsiveness) to policy rates. Banks reflect changes in policy rates to their own rates more 
slowly in case of cash abundance. A likely reason for high liquidity might be limited amount of 
profitable investment projects in the economy (Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Saborowski and 
Weber, 2013). Thus, liquidity is one of the most important factors that affect monetary 
transmission mechanism. We use liquid assets-to-total assets ratio as our first proxy for 
liquidity. Another proxy we used for liquidity is the revenues before interest-to-expenses before 
interest ratio. This ratio can also be used as a proxy for profitability. Both variables are collected 
from the Banks Association of Turkey. We use ROE to measure the profitability in banking 
sector. It is a proxy for market power. We expect interest rate pass-through to be lower as ROE 
increases (Sorensen and Werner, 2006). Starting from 9% in 2002, return on equity fluctuated 
to higher-than-15% level where it was around 11% in 2014. We believe, liquidity and 
profitability of the system affects pass-through especially on the credit side, deposits are less 
affected from these factors. Low quality assets induce problems in crisis periods by blotting 
liquidity. Pass-through cannot be completed in these periods since banks have to apply credit 
rationing rules. Following Saborowski and Weber (2013), we use nonperforming loans to total 
assets ratio as a proxy for asset quality. Banking sectors variables are obtained from the Banks 
Association of Turkey.  
Macroeconomic developments, conveying to their direct impacts on the banking 
industry, should also be taken under consideration. LIBOR is a short-term borrowing rate for 
AA-rated financial institutions. We can use LIBOR as a proxy for term structure (Hull, 2015). 
Term structure is an indicator of future growth of economy. Frisancho-Marischal and Howells 
(2009) finds a positive relationship between LIBOR and interest rate pass-through, but 
Betancourt et al. (2008) find a negative relationship. There is not a consensus about the effect 
of LIBOR in the literature. TRLIBOR rates were obtained from the Banks Association of Turkey. 
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We averaged the daily bid and ask values of overnight rates for each month to compute 
monthly averages of TRLIBOR. Additionally, we use growth rate of the Industrial Production 
Index (IPI) as another measure of economic growth. De Bondt (2002) suggests that industrial 
production growth would encourage banks to modify the allocation of their portfolios towards 
riskier projects and that would increase interest rate pass-through. However, since the 
perceived risk of borrowers is pro-cyclical, a reverse effect would also be possible (Leroy and 
Lucotte, 2015). We use CPI to measure inflation and expect a positive relation between pass-
through and inflation as in Ito and Sato (2006). Finally, ratio of financial account to GDP (FAGDP) 
was used to address the effects of capital inflows and outflows on the interest rate pass-
through behavior. FAGDP is included to address the post-crisis Turkish experience with capital 
inflows inducing rapid credit expansion. To the best of our knowledge, this variable was not 
previously used in the literature to address interest rate pass-through behavior. Nevertheless, 
it is not trivial to compute the FAGDP series due to the absence of a monthly measure of GDP. 
We overcame this limitation by creating a monthly version of GDP following the Turkish 
industrial production as a proxy variable. That is, GDP figure for a quarter was distributed to 
the months within that quarter in proportion with the respective industrial production figures 
of months. Capital inflows have a pro-cyclical nature, but we do not know how they affect 
interest rate pass-through.  
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
Regulatory quality index (RQI), exchange rate flexibility (FCLM2), dollarization(NFCP), 
short-term credits to total credits (STC), liquid assets to total assets (LIQ), revenues before 
interest to expenses before interest (NIRE), return on equity (ROE), nonperforming loans ratio 
(NPL), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), dollarization (NFCP), per capita GDP (GDPPC), broad 
money (M2GDP), and Boone indicator values are measured annually. We computed the annual 
first difference for these variables and attributed the same annual values for all months in the 
same year. TRLIBOR is released daily. We use the monthly average TRLIBOR as the monthly 
value. CPI (inflation), industrial production index (TRIPI), and financial account GDP (FAGDP) are 
released monthly. Wherever needed and applicable, the data series were seasonally adjusted 
using the Census-X12 technique. We compute percentage changes in CPI, IPI, and regulatory 
quality index; we use first differences in all other variables to assure stationarity. A list of 
variables, their abbreviations, sources and groups can be found in Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
of our variables are presented in Table 3 and 4. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
B. Estimation Strategy 
In order to measure the interest rate pass-through from policy rates to selected market 
interest rates conditional upon a number of important variables, we use an IVAR model whose 
extended version for panel data (IPVAR) is proposed by Towbin and Weber (2011). IVAR model 
in recursive form is written as; 





t t t kt t k t
k
A Y C A Y u t T

         ~ 0,tu N   (2) 
               0 1kt k k tA D D X   (3) 
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Notice that Equation 2 is the well-known presentation of a VAR setup except for the 
interaction relationship ( ktA ) which is defined in Equation 3. Substituting Equation (3) in 
Equation (2) yields: 





t k t k t k t t k t
k k
A Y C A Y C X B X Y u t T 
 
         (4) 
where tY  is a vector of endogenous variables, 0C is vector of intercept, tX represents 
interacted variable and t t kX Y  is the interaction term. kA , 1C  and kB are parameter vectors for 
endogenous variables, interacted variable and interaction term, respectively. 0A  is a lower 
triangular matrix which means that the impulse response functions are based on Cholesky 
decomposition, where the contemporaneous ordering of endogenous variables is important. 
This model allows that the interacted variable influences the dynamic relationship among 
endogenous variables. All variables including interaction variables should be stationary in order 
the model to predict the confidence intervals with minimum error. 
The nature of interaction in the IVAR specification is such that interaction terms not only 
affect the main variables of concern, but also they influence the relationship among them. This 
approach yields an array of IVAR estimates among which the researcher picks the ones 
corresponding to certain values of the interaction variables and subsequently calculate the 
impulse-response functions. Those certain values of continuous interaction variables are 
typically chosen as the 10th-90th or 25th-75th percentiles. For categorical interaction variables 
this choice is even trivial. Ultimately, the researcher is able to observe different impulse-
response functions at different values of interaction variables.   
An interacted panel VAR (IPVAR) has several advantages over alternative VAR 
specifications. Compared to an ordinary VAR including exogenous variables, IPVAR provides 
higher flexibility in capturing the effects of exogenous variables. Instead of a crude control for 
exogenous variables, IPVAR allows researcher to obtain an array of different VAR estimates at 
different percentiles of the exogenous variable, herein used as interaction variables. It is trivial 
that an IPVAR is a more capable tool compared to a panel VAR, as well, owing to the inclusion 
of interactions of variables. So, impulse response functions can be computed at selected low 
and high percentiles of the interaction variables. The same is valid for combinations of different 
percentiles of different interaction variables in the case of IPVARs with more than one 
interaction variables. In that, interaction variables can be seen as catalyzers. As a close rival, we 
could consider a factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) modeling framework owing to its high 
capability to capture composite effects of a number of variables on vector autoregressive 
dynamics, like Varlik et al. (2015). Having observed its limited transparency, i.e. the difficulties 
in interpreting the factors embedded within VAR, we purposefully avoided using a FAVAR 
specification. As a final point regarding our methodological choices, we must admit we have 
not included questions about potentially asymmetric response of deposit and credit rates to 
hikes and cuts of the central bank’s policy rate. Such choice of ours solely originates from a 
tendency to keep modeling framework simple enough. Since we do not use panel data, the 
model that we employ can be called interacted VAR (IVAR).  




The IPVAR modeling framework of subsection 4-1 provides us with interesting findings 
once it is implemented on data described in the previous subsection. In this subsection we 
describe our empirical estimates following the same conceptual grouping of variables as in 
subsection 4-A. While presenting the mechanism of interaction among our variables of interest, 
we use impulse-response functions (response functions in short) and display the cumulative 
response of deposit and credit rates upon introduction of a one standard deviation positive 
shock to CBRT’s policy interest rate. Shape and interpretation of response functions are not 
different from their counterparts in other types of VAR analysis except that alternative 
computational instances of response functions are produced in the case of IPVAR. Specifically, 
we present each response function twice, once maintaining the interaction variable at its 25th 
and once at 75th percentile. This allows us to observe the impact of policy rate changes on 
deposit (or credit) rates under two different economic setups: Intuitively, lower and higher 
values of interaction variables should be immune to choices of interaction variable’s 
percentiles. 25th and 75th percentile values of interaction variables for cumulative response of 
deposit and credit rates to policy rates are presented in Table 5.  
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
In vector autoregressive analysis, contemporaneous ordering of variables resides as a 
fundamental issue. Orthogonalization of original residuals and hence the shape and scale of 
impulse-response functions depend on how the variables of interest are ordered. The results 
we subsequently present are based on the ordering of “Policy rate, Deposit rate, Credit rate” 
which indicates that policy rate is the most exogenous variable receiving the earlier shocks and 
transmitting those to other variables. Upon a positive innovation to policy rate, banks are 
supposed to adjust the rates on deposits they receive. So the cost perception of banking 
industry will adjust once the policy rate has been subject to changes by the central bank. Finally, 
banks re-adjust their credit rates so as to remain profitable and competitive. Our preliminary 
analyses indicated that orderings of “Policy rate, Deposit rate, Credit rate” and “Policy rate, 
Credit rate, Deposit rate” yield almost the same response functions, i.e. the estimates remain 
intact. Therefore, we present the impulse-response functions that are based on the first 
ordering in the remainder of the paper. Based on Schwarz Information Criterion, lag order for 
our vector autoregressive specifications was set to one-month. 
For notational ease, we maintain the notation of (Policy rate, Deposit rate, Credit rate / 
Interaction variable) in Figures 3 through 18. This notation shows how the endogenous 
variables are ordered and which interaction variable has been employed. 
Time horizon of response functions is chosen as 18 months. It corresponds to typical 
control horizon of an inflation targeting central bank during which shocks received by the 
system are expected to dissipate in and disappear. In terms of an impulse-response function, a 
response function must converge to zero over the chosen time horizon, or equivalently a 
cumulative response function must settle at a plateau. 
Figures 3 through 18 display the impulse response functions for one interaction variable 
at a time, where the same information is tabulated as in Table 5.  The right hand side graph 
shows the impulse response functions for 25th quartile of each interaction variable whereas the 
left hand side graph shows the 75th quartile of the interaction variable. The following 
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paragraphs elaborate the estimated impulse-response functions prior to the in-depth 
discussion of the next section.  
Competitiveness and regulatory environment: Impulse response functions for Boone 
indicator is displayed in Figure 3. Responses of both deposit and credit rates are higher for 
higher values, i.e. the 75th percentile as compared to the 25th percentile, of Boone indicator. As 
competition drops down, level of pass-through increases. The higher the level of Boone 
indicator, the lower the competition in the market. That is, higher degrees of competition limit 
the pricing power of banks. We see a compatible pattern in HHI in Figure 4: Higher level of HHI 
indicates higher concentration; thus lower competition. Pass-through increases in both credits 
and deposits as concentration increases. On the other hand, interest rate pass-through is not 
very responsive to regulatory quality index (RQI). As can be seen in Figure 5, it has negative 
effect on deposit rates and almost no effect on credit rates. RQI series is reducing in time while 
policy rates are reducing. Banks do not reflect drops in policy rates to deposit rates because of 
the fierce competition in deposits. Banks had to increase deposits in order to increase deposits/ 
credits ratio, and therefore, they offer very generous rates for deposits. Deposit/ credit ratio is 
0,84 for 2014; which is a historical low record. The governor of the CBRT announced that they 
can intervene to increase it (Milliyet, 2014).  On the other hand, there is huge demand towards 
bank credits, and therefore, banks do not have to reflect falling rates to the credits (in 
accordance with credit rationing hypothesis). 
Operating characteristics of the banking industry: All variables, NPL, NIRE, ROE, and LIQ, 
which represent operating characteristics of banking sector have positive relationship with 
interest rate pass-through as Figures 6-9 present. These results are robust to 2008-2014 sub-
period and also other sensitivity checks. NPL is expected to have a positive relationship with 
pass-through but the relationship of all other variables with pass-through is negative or 
ambiguous in earlier findings. The fact is that profitability and liquidity increase pass-through in 
Turkish case. 
Financial development: Per capita GDP (GDPPC) and broad money (M2GDP) have a 
negative effect on interest rate pass-through as Figures 10 and 11 respectively present. This 
result is totally counterintuitive. Moreover, STC provides ambiguous effect on pass-through:  
Pass-through is higher for deposit rates, and lower for credit rates for higher values of STC 
(Figure 12). We expect, financial development expedites pass-through, however, the Turkish 
case presents a contradictory example. When we observe the data, we see a routine pattern 
of increase in GDPPC and M2GDP, and a routine pattern of decrease in STC. It seems pass-
through is higher for the initial years of the sampling period, and lower for the later years, 
regardless of these interaction variables. However, sensitivity analyses do not represent robust 
effects for the more stable 2008-2014 period; therefore, we can conclude that financial 
development has ambiguous effects on interest rate pass-through. 
Dollarization: Exchange rate flexibility (FCLM2) has a positive effect on interest rate 
pass-through while dollarization (NFCP) has almost no effect, as can be seen in Figures 13 and 
14 respectively. The former is an expected relationship, but the relationship between the latter 
and interest rate pass-through is not known. Sensitivity test results support a positive 
relationship between the two. We can conclude that dollarization does not have a negative 
significant effect on pass-through.  
Domestic macroeconomic environment: Figures 15 and 16 show the impulse response 
functions of TRLIBOR and CPI inflation, respectively. Both variables have positive effect on 
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interest rate pass-through as compatible with expectations. Figures 17 and 18 show the 
impulse response functions of TRIPI and FAGDP, respectively. Growth of economic activity 
(TRIPI) and financial account of GDP (FAGDP) has negative effect on interest rate pass-through. 
The negative effect of industrial production is compatible with the negative effect of GDP per 
capita. It seems that growth does not have a positive effect on pass-through in Turkey for 2002-
2014 period. We can rationalize the negative effect of FAGDP by emphasizing its pro-cyclical 
nature and economy’s negative relationship with GDP and industrial growth. Economic growth 
causes interest rate pass-through to drop, however, capital inflows increase during economic 
upturns. The 2008-2014 analysis provides counter-results, but this result is robust for other 
sensitivity tests. 2008-2014 results may reflect the impact of 2008 crisis. Capital inflows are in 
a diminishing trend in this period.   
Table 6 shows the expected and realized effects of interaction variables. RQI, NIRE, ROE, 
LIQ, GDPPC, M2GDP, and TRIPI are surprising us with the effect. But, these variables can have 
different effects of pass-through in different countries. For example, Sabarowski and Weber, 
(2013) find that some variables are significant in cross country analysis but they turn out be 
insignificant in within country tests.    
[Please insert Table 6 here]  
D. Sensitivity Tests 
The results in Section 3.3 document the pass-through measured in the order of policy 
rate, 1-month deposit rates, and commercial credits in the VAR equations. Some results are 
compatible with expectations, but some are confusing. In order to test the validity of our 
results, we run some sensitivity tests. First, we run the same analysis for 2008-2014 sub-period. 
We believe that some deviations from expected results can be originated from the important 
changes in pre-2008 period. Afterwards, we re-run the analysis by changing endogenous 
variables. We replaced 1-month deposit rates to 3-month deposit rates; and we also replaced 
1-month deposit rates back and altered commercial credits with consumer credits to follow up 
the changes from the original results and understand the differences. 
Even though the effect of most interaction variables are in line with the findings of the 
earlier literature, we believe that some periodic fluctuations cause deceiving results. The pre-
2008 period displays huge drops in overall interest rates and dramatic changes in many other 
macro variables in Turkey for 2008-2014 period. Therefore, we re-run the analysis for post-
2008 period. We present the results in Supplement 1. The results can be summarized as 
stronger for the more stable sub-period: The power of interaction is stronger for all variables. 
The only problem is in GDPPC. The effect of GDPPC is negative and stronger for this sub-period, 
contrary to expectations. We can interpret this result as either there is a structural problem in 
the system or increases in GDP really causes decline in interest rate pass-through.  
Second, we run the VAR in the order of policy rate, 3-month deposit rate, and 
commercial credits. The results are presented in Supplement 2. As expected, the results are 
not much different from the results obtained by using 1-month deposit rates. The only 
differences are observed in competition and regulatory environment variables: They result 
positively stronger in the second equation. Additionally, there is a slight negative effect of 
macroeconomic environment variables on the pass-through when we use 3-month deposit 
rates. But the general impact of interaction variables on endogenous variables does not change. 
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This result is not surprising, because both 1-month and 3-month deposits are short-termed, 
there should be slight difference in the effects of these deposits on the overall economy.  
 Lastly, we replaced commercial credits with consumer credits and do not change the 
ordering of the variables in the new equation: Policy rate, 1-month deposit rate, and consumer 
credits. The results are presented in Supplement 3. The results suggest those:  Increase in HHI 
has a positive effect on pass-through to credits and a negative effect on pass-through to 
deposits. The effect of competition in pass-through is lessened in total, because the negative 
impact on deposits is greater than the positive impact on credits.  Increase in exchange rate 
flexibility reduces pass-through to credits, and increase in dollarization reduces pass-through 
to deposits. Individuals seem to be more sensitive to exchange rates fluctuations than so are 
firms. Moreover, as NPL increases pass-through to credits falls down. NPL is another sensitive 
factor to individual consumers. Additionally, consumers seem to be less sensitive to inflation, 
financial development, and changes in LIBOR: Increases in CPI and GDPPC have negative effect 
on the pass-through to deposits. This effect would be negative in the case of commercial 
credits. Likewise, increase in TRLIBOR has no effect on the pass-through to deposits. This effect 
would be negative in the case of commercial credits. 
4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Findings of the previous section indicate that interest rate pass-through behavior, or 
pricing decisions by banks following a monetary policy interest rate innovation, has both 
structural and cyclical associations with other variables. In this section, we dig in our estimates 
to reveal workable insights. In broad terms, in line with Cottarelli et al. (1995) and Mishra et al. 
(2012), we find a positive relationship between competitiveness in banking industry and 
interest rate pass-through. This finding is supported by the negative relative relationship 
between banking sector concentration and interest rate pass-through. This result is similar to 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995), Sorensen and Werner (2006), Saborowski 
and Weber (2013), and Mishra et al. (2012). On the other hand, our finding indicating a negative 
relationship between regulatory quality and interest rate pass-through is different from the 
findings of Mishra et al. (2012) and Saborowski and Weber (2013). This no relationship may be 
temporary, and it evolves towards a positive one as stability in interest rates increase. The 
relationship between RQI and pass-through turns out to be positive for 2008-2014 period.   
 These measurements suggest maintaining a sufficient degree of competitiveness and 
as low concentration as possible in the banking industry. Regulatory quality gains importance 
in the last half of the analysis period. It is salutary that bank regulation in Turkey was enhanced 
after the devastating impact of the 2001 crisis of Turkey, especially by means of the Banking 
Law No 5411 legislated and enacted on 19 October 20015 and 01 November 2005, respectively. 
Banks’ operational characteristics suggest more upon what is said by competitiveness 
and concentration. In that, our specifications suggest that when banks are more liquid and 
profitable, they tend to reflect policy rate changes to their deposit and credit rates more. These 
results contradict with Gigineshvili (2011) and Sabarowski and Weber (2013), which find a 
negative relation between interest rate pass-through and liquidity in their cross-country 
analysis. However, Sabarowski and Weber (2013) do not find the same relationship in country-
by-country analysis. It can be a similar case in Turkey, banking sector variables may behave 
differently in different countries.  Moreover, Turkey has special sub-periods regarding liquidity 
in the analysis period. These findings are likely to be associated with massive cuts of policy rates 
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at the beginning of our sample period and after the Global Financial Crisis during which banks 
might have enjoyed ample liquidity.  
In tandem with Mishra et al. (2012) and Saborowski and Weber (2013), our findings 
suggest higher interest rate pass-through with higher exchange rate flexibility. Literature is split 
up about dollarization: one group defends a positive relationship (Leiderman et al., 2006), and 
the other claims a negative relationship (Saborowski and Weber, 2013). Our findings are 
consistent with those of Leiderman et al. (2006). The higher the dollarization, the faster the 
monetary transmission.  
We observe a very surprising outcome when financial development indicators are used 
as interaction variables. Per capita GDP, ratio of broad money-to-GDP (M2GDP), and ratio of 
financial accounts to GDP (FAGDP) reduce interest rates pass-through to deposits and credits, 
both. These results contradict with earlier research (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Saborowski 
and Weber, 2013). 
The term structure proxy, TRLIBOR, increases pass-through in general.  This outcome is 
consistent with Frisancho-Marischal and Howell (2009), which finds a positive relationship 
between pass-through and LIBOR. On the other hand, 2008-2014 results provide a 
contradictory outcome, which is consistent with Betancourt et al (2008), which finds a negative 
relationship between LIBOR and pass-through. Industrial production growth, on the other 
hand, reduces pass-through. This result is contradicting De Bondt (2002) and justify Leroy and 
Lucotte (2015); however, it is in line with our findings for GDPPC and M2GDP.   
Facing higher domestic inflation, degree of pass-through becomes higher for retail 
rates. This result is consistent with Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and Gigineshvili (2011). Noting 
that inflation in this study is actual rather than expected inflation, this suggests that banks 
become more sensitive to possible declines in their real profits on credits once they have 
observed higher inflation. Equivalently, banks seem to update their expectations in an adaptive 
manner. On the other hand, banks do not seem to be that much sensitive about pass-through 
in deposit rates. One standard deviation of positive shock in inflation has a slightly positive 
effect on the pass-through to deposit rates. Consistent with profitability concerns, banks do not 
reflect policy changes to deposits in order to keep their expectations in higher inflation 
environments. 
On the balance of payments front, despite their essential equality, we use financial 
account to GDP ratio to address the impacts of capital inflows. Here, higher interest rate pass-
through is negatively affected in the case of higher FA/GDP ratios. So the difference between 
pass-through to credit and deposit rates get lower upon increased capital inflows to Turkey. 
This result is especially important having observed the fears of the Central Bank of Turkey from 
fast expansion of domestic credits financed by rapid short-term capital inflows. Indeed, the 
Bank eloquently tailored its interest rate corridor so as to gently repel inflows of “hot money” 
in the recent past. Note that higher de facto flexibility of the exchange rate regime implies 
higher pass-through of policy rate innovations to both deposit and credit rates, i.e. banks tend 
include the price of exchange rate risks in their rates.  
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Table 1: Correlation between policy rate and retail rates 
  
  Contemporaneous Correlation Short-Term Effect Long-Term Effect R-squared 
Consumer Credits 0.64 0.41 0.77 0.99 
Auto Credits 0.62 0.32 0.81 0.99 
House Credits 0.63 0.45 0.85 0.99 
Commercial Credits 0.67 0.46 0.85 0.99 
1 Month Deposits 0.89 0.98 0.98 1.00 
3 Month Deposits 0.81 0.76 0.94 1.00 
 
Credits Average 0.64 0.41 0.82 0.99 
Deposits Average 0.85 0.87 0.96 1.00 




Table 2: Interaction Variables     




 Boone   Boone Indicator    St. Louis FED 
 RQI   Regulatory Quality Index    World Bank Databank 
  HHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index    Self Computed 
         
Banking Sector 
Features  
ROE   
Return on Equity    Banks Association of Turkey 
  NIRE   Liquidity/ Profitability  Revenues before interest / expenses before interest  Banks Association of Turkey 
  LIQ   Liquidity  Liquid assets / total assets  Banks Association of Turkey 
 
 
 NPL   Non-Performing Loans  Non-performing loans / total assets  Banks Association of Turkey 
          
Financial Development  STC   Short-Term Credits    Banks Association of Turkey 
  GDPPC  Per Capita GDP    World Bank Databank 
  M2GDP   Broad Money  M2 / GDP  World Bank Databank 
 
Dollarization 
          
 FCLM2   Exchange Rate Flexibility  Foreign Currency Loans / M2  CBRT & Ministry of Development 
  NFCP  Dollarization  Foreign currency liabilities - assets / equity  Banks Association of Turkey 
         
Macroeconomic 
Situation  
TRLIBOR   
Turkish Overnight LIBOR    Banks Association of Turkey 
  CPI   Consumer Price Index    Central Bank of Turkey-EDDS 
  TRIPI   Turkish Industrial Production Index    Central Bank of Turkey-EDDS 












Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Original Time Series Used in the Study (February 2002 - December 2014) 
  PR Cretlcons Cretlauto CretlHous Cretlcomm Deptl1m Deptl3m Boone HHI RQI NPL NIRE 
Number of Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 107 155 155 155 155 
Mean 16.33 24.51 20.41 19.89 20.12 17.23 18.25 -0.03 0.00 0.28 4.92 85.27 
Median 13.82 20.94 17.94 16.44 17.52 15.18 15.90 -0.02 -0.01 0.30 3.49 73.57 
Min 4.85 11.82 9.61 8.30 8.43 5.24 6.48 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 2.58 64.10 
25th Percentile 7.00 15.19 12.84 12.01 12.14 7.60 9.26 -0.04 -0.02 0.27 2.80 69.71 
75th Percentile 17.50 26.77 22.45 21.75 22.63 17.95 19.12 -0.01 0.03 0.38 4.97 81.08 
Max 57.00 71.05 52.72 52.98 59.64 62.02 59.42 -0.01 0.07 0.42 12.70 192.84 
Standard Deviation 12.32 12.73 10.70 11.46 11.46 13.18 12.43 0.02 0.03 0.13 3.18 33.60 
Skewness 1.63 1.60 1.52 1.49 1.52 1.72 1.71 -1.42 0.51 -0.79 1.62 2.57 
Kurtosis 1.90 1.93 1.45 1.19 1.70 2.13 2.09 1.26 -1.04 -0.63 1.17 5.54 
 
Table 3 (Continued): Summary Statistics of the Original Time Series Used in the Study (February 2002 - December 2014) 
  ROE Liquidity GDPPC M2GDP STC FCLM2 NFCP TRLIBOR CPI Turkish IPI FAGDPMON 
Number of Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 132 148 154 119 152 
Mean 14.56 55.82 8493.48 48.27 0.44 0.00 36.91 15.63 156.52 0.29 -0.06 
Median 14.05 55.88 9309.51 48.56 0.43 0.00 33.85 14.04 155.05 0.40 -0.05 
Min 9.20 34.12 3570.55 34.59 0.33 0.00 22.27 4.52 76.30 -6.00 -0.23 
25th Percentile 12.77 47.66 7117.23 40.47 0.36 0.00 31.56 7.25 115.76 -0.60 -0.10 
75th Percentile 16.55 64.34 10515.01 55.36 0.52 0.01 43.85 17.98 190.63 1.45 -0.02 
Max 19.50 71.64 10975.07 60.64 0.59 0.01 57.29 47.24 248.82 6.00 0.05 
Standard Deviation 3.12 10.88 2385.60 8.98 0.09 0.00 10.91 10.63 47.16 1.87 0.06 
Skewness 0.02 -0.31 -0.79 -0.11 0.32 0.24 0.86 1.64 0.22 -0.24 -0.35 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Differenced Time Series Used in the Study (March 2002 - December 2014) 
  PR Cretlcons Cretlauto CretlHous Cretlcomm Deptl1m Deptl3m Boone HHI RQI NPL NIRE 
Number of Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 142 144 154 144 144 
Mean -0.31 -0.37 -0.26 -0.27 -0.30 -0.35 -0.32 0.07 -0.01 0.26 -0.82 9.98 
Median -0.06 -0.24 -0.28 -0.28 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.50 -0.72 
Min -3.97 -7.46 -6.75 -4.92 -7.36 -4.54 -4.24 -0.05 -0.06 -0.75 -5.00 -35.65 
25th Percentile -0.52 -0.76 -0.84 -0.65 -0.76 -0.44 -0.47 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -1.27 -5.99 
75th Percentile 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.38 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.13 9.94 
Max 2.67 5.21 6.31 4.46 2.49 2.05 2.25 0.68 0.03 2.86 1.53 128.27 
Standard Deviation 0.91 1.61 1.61 1.39 1.26 1.01 1.02 0.18 0.03 0.89 1.56 39.79 
Skewness -1.15 -0.57 0.19 0.12 -1.56 -1.97 -1.72 2.97 -0.46 1.91 -1.32 2.10 
Kurtosis 4.74 5.39 4.83 3.60 7.41 5.15 4.43 7.91 -1.37 3.24 1.94 3.98 
 
Table 4 (Continued): Summary Statistics of the Differenced Time Series Used in the Study (March 2002 - December 2014) 
  ROE LIQ GDPPC M2GDP STC FCLM2 NFCP TRLIBOR CPI Turkish IPI FAGDP 
Number of Observations 144 144 154 154 144 144 120 148 153 118 152 
Mean 0.15 -2.93 574.68 1.24 -0.02 0.00 3.48 -0.25 0.01 -1.23 -0.06 
Median -1.27 -4.01 610.04 1.49 -0.02 0.00 1.66 -0.11 0.01 -1.32 -0.05 
Min -4.06 -7.99 -1758.37 -5.63 -0.07 0.00 -9.44 -22.86 -0.01 -46.00 -0.23 
25th Percentile -2.02 -4.94 329.04 -0.61 -0.03 0.00 -0.85 -0.54 0.00 -2.00 -0.10 
75th Percentile 1.13 -2.22 1261.69 4.72 0.00 0.00 6.25 0.16 0.01 -0.10 -0.02 
Max 8.31 6.12 1582.24 6.07 0.04 0.00 22.88 22.99 0.03 26.00 0.05 
Standard Deviation 3.74 3.71 889.90 3.56 0.03 0.00 8.20 2.86 0.01 6.10 0.06 
Skewness 1.08 1.16 -1.27 -0.33 0.20 -0.77 0.99 0.26 0.64 -2.25 -0.35 









Table 5: Numerical Summary of Cumulative Impulse-Response Functions 
 Cumulative Response of Deposit Rate  
to Policy Rate 
Cumulative Response of Credit Rate  
to Policy Rate 
 
Interaction variable -at 25th percentile  
of interaction  
variable 
-at 75th percentile  
 of interaction 
variable 
-at 25th percentile  
of interaction 
variable 





Boone indicator 0.9 1 0.6 0.9 3 
HHI 0.9 1 0.7 0.9 4 
Regulatory quality 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 5 
NPL ratio 0.9 0.9 0.6 1 6 
NIRE 0.9 1 0.7 1 7 
ROE in banking sector 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 8 
Liquidity 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 9 
GDPPC 1 1 1 0.7 10 
M2GDP 1 0.8 1 0.9 11 
Short-term credits 0.8 0.9 1 0.8 12 
FCLM2 0.7 1 0.7 0.9 13 
NFCP 0.8 0.8 1 1 14 
TRLIBOR 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 15 
CPI inflation 0.9 1 0.8 1 16 
Industrial growth 0.9 0.9 1.2 0.9 17 




Table 6: Expected and Realized Effects of Interaction Variables on Turkish Interest Rate Pass-Through 
Interaction Variable  Expected Effect  Realized Effect on Deposits  Realized Effect on Deposits 
Boone  +  +  + 
HHI  +  +  + 
RQI  +  -  0 
NPL  +  0  + 
NIRE  -  +  + 
ROE  -  +  0 
LIQ  -  +  0 
GDPPC  +  0  - 
M2GDP  +  -  - 
STC  +  +  - 
FCLM2  +  +  + 
NFCP  -  0  0 
TRLIBOR  +  0  + 
CPI  +  +  + 
TRIPI  +  0  - 
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 Figure 3: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / Boone) 
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 Figure 4: Impulse-response functions 










Figure 5: Impulse-response functions 





 Figure 6: Impulse-response functions 










Figure 7: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / NIRE) 
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 Figure 8: Impulse-response functions 










Figure 9: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / LIQ) 
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Figure 10: Impulse-response functions 










 Figure 11: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / M2GDP) 
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 Figure 12: Impulse-response functions 










Figure 13: Impulse-response functions 




Figure 14: Impulse-response functions 










 Figure 15: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / TRLIBOR) 
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 Figure 16: Impulse-response functions 










Figure 17: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / TRIPI) 
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Figure 18: Impulse-response functions 
(Policy, Deposit, Credit / FAGDP) 
 
 
 
 
